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68o THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY I. THE FREE BANKING POSITION A Laissez-Faire Financial System
So what would a free banking system look like, and how would it operate? Imagine a hypothetical laissez-faire economy with an underlying 'imperfect' economic environment -information is scarce and asymmetric, there are nontrivial agency and coordination problems, and so on. These problems give rise to a financial system characterised by the presence of intermediaries that enable agents to achieve superior outcomes to those they could otherwise achieve (e.g. by cutting down on transactions and monitoring costs). Perhaps the most important intermediaries are banks. These invest funds on behalf of client investors, some of whom hold the bank's debt liabilities and others its equity. Most bank debts are deposits of one form or another, and most of these can be redeemed on demand. Many deposits are also used to make payments by cheque. The equityholders are residual claimants, and their capital provides a buffer that enables a bank to absorb losses and still be able to pay its debtholders in full. The banking industry exhibits extensive economies of scale, but not natural monopoly,1 and there is typically a small number of nationwide branch banks, with a larger number of specialist banks that cater to niche markets. The industry is competitive and efficient by any reasonable standard. We can think of this banking system as operating on a convertible, commodity-based monetary standard (e.g. a gold standard).2 Bank liabilities are denominated in terms of the economy's unit of account (e.g. the pound), and underlying the system is some rule that ties the unit of account to a unit of the 'anchor' commodity on which the monetary standard is based.3 The price level in this system is then determined by conditions in the market for the 'anchor' commodity.4 Bank currency is convertible -the banks must redeem their currency when required to -and so the amount of currency in circulation ' There is much evidence of economies of scale in banking, but no evidence that these economies of scale are so large that the industry is a natural monopoly. It follows that one cannot defend the central bank's monopoly privileges over the currency supply on the grounds that free banking would lead to a currency monopoly anyway. Nor should natural monopoly be confused with the use of a single economy-wide unit of account. There will typically be one generally used unit of account (e.g., the pound), but the use of a single unit of account reflects economics of standardisation (or economies in use) and not natural monopoly, which necessarily involves economies of production. See Dowd (I993), ch. 5. 2 The alternative is to assume that we have a free banking system based on convertibility into a frozen monetary base (as discussed, e.g., by Selgin, I 994). It seems to me that a commodity-based system is more natural: all historical free banking systems were of this type, and the assumption of a frozen monetary base presupposes some earlier government intervention -an assumption that can be awkward if one is trying to assess the validity of intervention in the first place.
3 For example, in a gold standard, the rule would require that banks of issue peg the exchange rate between their currency and gold (or, if one prefers, peg the nominal price of gold). We can then think of the equilibrium nominal prices of individual commodities as determined by the combination of relative demand and supply factors and the fixed nominal price of gold. Gold can thus be regarded as the 'anchor' commodity that ties down nominal prices throughout the economy. 4 Suppose there is a gold discovery under a gold standard. At initial prices, there is now an excess supply of gold and excess demands for other commodities. The relative price of gold against other commodities must therefore fall, but the nominal price of gold cannot adjust because the rules of the gold standard hold it fixed. Hence, the relative price of gold falls by means of a rise in the nominal prices of other goods. We can therefore think of the price level as determined by the factors that determine the relative price of gold, and hence by demand and supply in the gold market. The conclusion that banks under laissez-faire would maintain high levels of capital is also consistent with the empirical evidence (see also Benston and Kaufman (BK), I9955 pp. 3-4). For example, US banks in the antebellum period were subject to virtually no federal regulations and yet had capital ratios in most years of over 40 % (Kaufman I992, p. 386). US banks were subject to more regulation at the turn of the century, but even then their capital ratios were close to 20%, and capital ratios were still around I5% when federal deposit insurance was established in I933-4 (Kaufman, I992). The evidence is also consistent with the associated prediction that laissez-faire banks face low probabilities of failure. Thus US banks appear to have been fairly safe in the period before the Civil War (Dowd, I992, ch. i i), and for the period afterwards, Benston et al. (I986), pp. 53-9 report that bank failure rates were lower than the failure rates for non-financial firms. Losses to depositors were correspondingly low (Kaufman, I 988). Failure rates and losses were also low for other relatively unregulated systems such as those in Canada, Scotland, Switzerland and various others (see, e.g., the case studies in Dowd (I992)).
C Royal Economic
Nor is there any reason to expect banking instability arising from the ways in which banks relate to each other, either because of competitive pressures, or because of 'contagion' from weak banks to strong ones. It is frequently argued THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY that competitive pressures produce instability by forcing 'good' banks to go along with the policies of 'bad' ones (e.g. Goodhart I988, pp. 47-9). The underlying argument seems to be that if the bad banks expand rapidly, they can make easy short-term profits which pressure the managers of good banks to expand rapidly as well, with the result that the banking system as a whole cycles excessively from boom to bust and back again. However, a major problem with this argument is that it is not in a bank's interest to engage in aggressive expansion of the sort this argument envisages. A bank can usually expand rapidly only by allowing the average quality of its loans to deteriorate, and a major deterioration in its loan quality will undermine its long-run financial health and its ability to maintain customer confidence. A profitmaximising bank will not choose to undermine itself this way, even if other banks appear to be doing so. Indeed, if a bank believes that its competitors are taking excessive risks, the most rational course of action is for it to distance itself from them -perhaps to build up its financial strength further -in anticipation of the time when they start to suffer losses and lose confidence. The bank is then strongly placed to win over their customers and increase its market share at their expense, and perhaps even drive them out of business. The bank would have to forgo short-term profits, but it would win out in the long run. There is no reason, then, to suppose that competitive pressures as such would force free banks into excessive cycling.5 Then there is the contagion argument that the difficulties of one bank might induce the public to withdraw funds from other banks and threaten the stability of the financial system. The conclusion normally drawn from this argument is that we need a central bank to prevent 'contagion' by providing lender of last resort support to a bank in difficulties. However, this argument ignores the earlier point that good banks have a strong incentive to distance themselves from bad ones. If the good banks felt there was any danger of contagion, they would take appropriate action -they would strengthen themselves and curtail credit to weak banks -to help ensure that contagion did not in fact occur. Indeed, as discussed already, they would position themselves to offer the customers of weaker banks a safe haven when their own banks get into difficulties. A serious danger of contagion is therefore inconsistent with equilibrium. Instead, we would expect the difficulties of a weak bank to trigger a 'flight to quality' in which customers transfer their accounts to stronger banks, and this expectations is borne out by the evidence which tells us that runs occur in response to news that a particular bank or group of banks has sustained major losses that call into question its ability to repay its debts (see, e.g., Kaufman, I988). When runs occur, the typical scenario is a flight to quality, with substantial inflows of funds to the stronger banks, and there is little evidence that runs are contagious (see, e. In fact, someone who observed this instability might easily attribute it to the market itself, and falsely believe that the banking system actually needs the LLR support that is, in reality, undermining it. A major cause of banking instability -the LLRcould easily be mistaken for its cure -and, unfortunately, often is. A system of deposit insurance has comparable effects. Once we introduce deposit insurance, depositors no longer have any incentives to monitor bank management and managers no longer need to worry about maintaining confidence. A bank's rational response is to reduce its capital, since the main point of maintaining capital strength -to maintain depositor confidence -no longer applies (see, e.g., Dowd I994b). Even if an individual bank wished to maintain its capital strength, it would be out-competed by competitors who cut their capital ratios to reduce their costs and passed some of the benefits to depositors by offering them higher interest rates. The fight for market share would then force the good banks to imitate the bad. Deposit insurance consequently transforms a strong capital position into a competitive liability, reduces institutions' financial health and makes them more likely to fail. It also encourages more bank risk-taking at the margin: if a bank takes more risks and the risks pay off, then it keeps the additional profits; but if the risks do not pay off, part of the cost is passed on to the deposit insurer. The bank therefore takes more risks and becomes even weaker than its capital ratio alone would suggest. These claims are borne out by the evidence: the claim that banks reduce run to currency (e.g. BK, I994, pp. 4-5) .
However, I believe these arguments miss the point. The relevant choice is not that between government and private deposit insurance, but that between government deposit insurance and the free-banking scenario outlined earlier, in which banks provide implicit insurance through strong capitalisation. If bank customers demand safe banks -as we all agree they do -the free market would provide safe banks via appropriate bank capitalisation, not through private deposit insurance. The reason is straightforward: providing depositor security through deposit insurance creates conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and the insurance agency, and handling these conflicts is costly; I996] CASE FOR FINANCIAL LAISSEZ-FAIRE 685 however, providing security through bank capitalisation does not create such conflicts, and is therefore a more efficient means of ensuring depositor safety. Private deposit insurance would of course be allowed under free banking, but we would not expect to see it, and this expectation is confirmed by the evidence. I readily accept their point that bank failures involve third-party effects, but would argue these effects merely reinforce my position. The third-party-effects argument is essentially an argument for the safer system, and we have already seen that the safer system is free banking. It is therefore an argument in favour of free banking and against deposit insurance. In any case, the danger of thirdparty effects is not unique to bank failures, and applies to the failures of most other institutions as well. So BK must argue either that bank failures are 'special' in ways that other failutres are not, or they must be consistent and advocate a policy of preventing all institutional failures, and not just those of banks. Yet they are unwilling to do either.
III. SHEILA DOW Sheila Dow advances two principal arguments against free banking. The first is a version of the earlier argument that free banking produces excessive cycling (e.g. Dow, I p. I99; i996, p. 702), from which she concludes that there is a need for the state or a central bank to 'stand above' the market process and take action to correct the excessive cycling to which laissez-faire is prone. Her argument is distinctive in that it rests on an underlying post-Keynesian view of the uncertainty attached to valuing bank assets and not just on a herd theory of bankers following each other over the cliff. However, despite its distinctiveness, it is still open to the objections already made against the excessive cycling theory: it ignores the point that individual free banks do have incentives to go against the market trend, and thereby counteract it, because doing so enables them to increase their long-run market shares; and it is empirically falsified, because there is little evidence of such cycles under historical free banking systems. In any case, even if free banking does produce some cycling, it still does not follow that it produces excessive cycling to which some form of intervention is an appropriate solution. Intervention has costs of its own -it uses up resources, the parties involved have their own interests, and so on; it cannot therefore be treated as a costless process that is guaranteed to produce the result its advocates hope for. One must also keep in mind that the historical record suggests that real-world intervention has destabilised the financial system rather than stabilised it (e.g. Dowd (ed.), I992). Dow's postKeynesian version of the cycling argument also has its own distinctive problems. If assets are so difficult to value, then how can we expect central bankers to know where the private bankers are going off the rails? If they don't know, how can we expect them to ameliorate cycles and not inadvertently add to them? And even if they do know, what can they do about it if they are as powerless over the cost and volume of credit as Dow seems to suggest they are?6 6 I also reject her view that the argument for free banking hinges on the ignoring of uncertainty. Uncertainty is intrinsic to economic life, and banks have to live with it as much as anyone else. The critical issue is not whether uncertainty exists, but whether uncertainty makes valuation as difficult as she suggests Dow also opposes free banking for another reason. She effectively argues that free banking is pointless because central banking would emerge spontaneously from it (e.g. Dow and Smithin, I994, p. 2I), or at least would do so in cases where the free banking was 'successful' and did not lead to some form of chaos (e.g. Dow, I996, p. 704). The Dow-Smithin (DS) argument is that the requirement of a credit-based economy produce a degree of centralisation of power that is effectively the same as central banking. When a crisis occurs under free banking, there is a scramble for safe assets, a scramble that focuses on the banking system's ultimate settlement asset. The issuer of this asset then has great power over the system and becomes defacto a central bank (see, e.g. Dow There are a number of problems with this argument. (i) While it is true that crises do produce a scramble for safe assets, we would expect this scramble to take the form of a flight to quality, and the evidence confirms that it generally does; it does not usually take the form of a scramble for some ultimate settlement asset, whatever that might be. There tends to be recycling within the banking system, rather than a flight from it. (2) Even if there was a scramble for 'ultimate' settlement assets, it still does not follow that such assets are issued by one institution only. To assume that there is only one key institution consequently begs the point at issue. One must also keep in mind that the experience of historical free banking suggests that there is always more than one 'big' bank; no bank ever spontaneously established its supremacy over all the others. To assume that there is only one key institution in the free banking system therefore also flies in the face of the evidence. (3) Even if one accepts their logic, DS establish the existence of the wrong animal. At most they establish the possibility of a private bankers' 'club', a club that might impose 'rules' on and sometimes assist its members, but establishing the existence of full-blown central banking is an altogether different matter. The powers of a private bankers' club would be (and historically were) extremely limited: membership would be voluntary in a way that 'official' regulations are not; club powers would be determined by the banks themselves, not by some outside agency, and as a corollary, club officials would be accountable to the banks rather than to outsiders; and, perhaps most important, the scope of club rules and the demands they would make on members would be far less than those implied by modern central banking (see, e.g., Dowd, I994a). (4) And, finally, even if one accepts their whole argument, they still have no substantial objection to free banking. If they are right, they merely establish that free banking would be pointless, but not harmful; but if I am right, then free banking is best and central banking is harmful. But whoever is right, we would it does. In my view, she exaggerates these difficulties, and I can only agree with BK (I996, pp. 69I) when they say that banks and the public do in fact find ways of valuing bank assets and liabilities that work reasonably well in practice.
I996] CASE FOR FINANCIAL
LAISSEZ-FAIRE 687 never choose to suppress free banking in favour of central banking -free banking wins by Pascal's wager.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
None of the critics of free banking has presented a convincing case that free banking is an exception to the general rule in favour of free trade. The prima facie case in favour of free banking therefore still stands. However, one should also assess the competing theories against the evidence, and the evidence clearly indicates that historical free banking was in fact stable, just as free-banking theory predicts. The conventional view that free banking could not be stable must therefore be rejected -and with it the conventional wisdom that tries to justify central banking and state intervention in the financial system.
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